Human Dignity and Human Rights
n the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the preamble states:
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. [emphasis added] Article 1 of the UDHR reads:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. [emphasis added] The UDHR, and most human rights advocates, generally argue that the human rights man enjoys, both positive entitlements and negative obligations, are a product of the inherent dignity of man. Without this dignity being upheld, man is being deprived of his various rights. The espousal and maintenance of dignity, or the lack thereof, is the measurement of human rights.If this is true, there are two important questions that must be asked:First, what is the argument for rights as descendent from dignity?Second, are there errors in this view and if so, why did the framers of the UDHR not avoid such obvious pitfalls?The Argument from DignityPhilosopher Jack Donnelly argues:
The source of human rights is man’s moral nature, which is only loosely linked to the “human nature” defined by scientifically ascertainable needs. Human rights are “needed” not for life but for a life of dignity…violations of human rights deny one’s humanity; they do not necessarily keep one from satisfying one’s needs. We have human rights not to the requisites for health but to those things “needed” for a life of dignity, for a life worthy of a human being, a life that cannot be enjoyed without these rights. As Donnelly sees it, human rights arise from human action. He categorically denies they originate from a deity, society, or nature. Instead, “human rights represent a social choice of a particular moral vision of human potentiality.” Donnelly argues that man has profound potential for good towards others and for themselves, a “moral vision” or “potentiality” as he describes it. That potentiality can swing in a number of directions, but under the guidelines of an appropriate moral vision towards dignity and worth, it can largely be used for good. Thus, “human rights are a social practice that aims to realize a particular vision of human dignity and potential by institutionalizing basic rights.” Under this view, rights are social guarantees (and in accordance with the social or moral component comes a legal element exists as well) toward the potentiality Donnelly envisions. Specifically, he contends the UDHR “tells us little about what life is like in most countries, but it sets out minimum conditions for a dignified life, a life worthy of a human being, and it sets out those requirements in the form of rights.”But there are also historical reasons, aside from the philosophical defense given by Donnelly. The prevailing opinion is that some historical awareness is needed to properly appreciate why the UDHR was drafted with appeals to dignity.Solving Two ProblemsWhen drafting the UDHR, the framers came across two major problems: the problem of pluralism and the problem of individual and state.The first is the problem of worldviews. The United Nations Security Council combines disparate and very conflicting philosophies of different nations and civilizations. From communist China to American democracy to French and German nationalism, the coalesced groups did not hold a great deal of commonality in theory or philosophy. How were they to circumvent this stumbling block to create a single document that eliminated incongruence? Philosopher Michael Novak bluntly states, “that agreement on common principles—a common philosophy of human nature and destiny—was out of the question.”Philosopher and advisor to the commission, Jacques Maritain devised a brilliant solution. Maritain quickly acknowledged attempting to find congruence between the differing worldviews or convincing particular groups to surrender their beliefs in support of competing and sometimes contradictory outlooks (as compared to their own) is impossible. However, he argued that in practice as opposed to theory, most of the groups involved held a great deal in common. Moreover, most of the common practices actually were justified through very different theories.Maritain saw that as an opportunity: if the emphasis could be shifted to practice and not one universal theory, all or most groups could subscribe to the document without having to compromise any beliefs.Admittedly, not all of the practices enumerated in the document were or are accepted without hesitation. Some stretching and convoluted logic was occasionally required to make the rights acceptable. Most notably, articles that called for healthcare, paid vacations and other imaginative amenities were difficult even for the West to accept. Inevitably, all complied except for the then Soviet Union.The second problem of individual and state was an almost East versus West divide, if there is such a thing. Novak explains the problem as such:
Charles Malik, head of the Commission writing the Declaration of Human Rights, played a role similar to Maritain’s on pluralism with regard to the concepts of person and society. The Soviet delegation was allergic to the Western use of the term individual, and the U.S. representative, Eleanor Roosevelt, was firm in insisting that the individual is prior to the state. Other delegations had difficulties with both those terms. It seemed for a time that the impasse between rival political philosophies could not be broken. Malik’s solution was equally as brilliant as Maritain’s. His resolution was to substitute the term “individual” with the word “person.” Novak continues his explanation:
A cat or a dog, even a tree, can be an individual, but only a human being (or God and the angels) can be a person. Person is far more specific to the human race; it is a far more humanistic term. What makes a person a person, rather more than merely an individual, is a spiritual capacity: the capacity to reflect and choose, to be imaginative and creative, to be an originating source of action. We have two cats at home, and they merely behave. They can do no other than follow their own instincts. Our children, by contrast, do not merely follow the law of their own natures; they improvise, they think of new and crazy things, they create new personae for themselves.
Moreover, persons are reared over long years in families, and it is in families that their identities, habits, and character are established. Families further participate in whole networks of kin, neighborhood, religious tradition, and other intermediate associations, natural and civil, and in and through those relations live out a thick social identity. In this sense, societies take shape long before states do. Persons are social beings before they are aware of having their own distinctive personalities. Persons come to fulfillment only in community, and communities have as their end and purpose the raising of persons worthy of their inherent dignity. Dignity inheres in them because they are destined to be free to reflect and to choose, and thus to be provident over the course of their own lives, responsible for their own actions. A person is capable of insight, love, and long-term commitment. Such creatures are deserving of respect from other rational creatures. Their inherent nature makes civilization possible, since civilization is constituted by conversation, the art of persuasion through reason, mutual respect. Civilized persons argue respectfully. Barbarians use clubs. Novak summarizes as such:
These characteristics of person give rise, in turn, to the four main principles whose force is felt in every one of the thirty principles of the Declaration: Every human being without exception is worthy of dignity, liberty, equality, and brotherhood. In other words, the very term person implies a vision of a universal society, which for reasons of practicality and local autonomy, and by the natural workings of culture and history, is organized through countless local associations of varying sizes and horizons. The crux of the compromise of the term person, therefore, is that a person from an individualistic perspective recognizes the inherent rights not necessarily of the group, but of each and every citizen. Indeed, persons are members of various associations, familial or otherwise, but they are also ends in themselves worthy of recognition and respect.Likewise, from the statist vantage point, a person minimizes the focus of attention on individuality and allows a shift towards the sundry communities of importance. It is true that a person is worthy of protection and attention, but the alleged virtue of community also merits praise and respect.In that sense, the term person is extraordinarily similar to the theory-practice divide solved by Maritain. Person is the practical end that generally ignores the underlying philosophy, instead allowing for the dissimilar groups to paint their own thought onto the canvas of the term. Person has more than one meaning and history, giving both groups the opportunity to use it despite serious differences. Again, practice demonstrates a capacity for overcoming theory.Does It Work?In serious ways, the answer is no. Particularly with respect to the way rights are conceived. The application of rights being outlandish wish lists in later Articles aside, the notion of rights takes on multiple meaning and applications that do not necessarily have any sustainable foundation.Observe the list of rights in the document: many explicitly iterate what states must do for citizens in addition to listing actions strictly prohibited, behavior one (or the state) may not do. As Novak says of the economic rights, “these rights are not spoken of as immunities from oppression by the state but as entitlements to goods and benefits from the state.”But as Novak and others have made clear, no nation is either able or inclined to adhere strictly to the parameters of UDHR on most accounts. Moreover, if rights are existential as is a necessary condition if they are based in dignity, it is automatically contradictory that they are contingent upon a state’s wealth. Rights must be firmly entrenched and defended or protected by the state, not tangibly furnished. One necessarily gainsays the other.But the real crux is basing rights in dignity. It appears that in some respect, basing in dignity is an intellectual attempt to legitimize the proverbial tugging at heart strings. While it is a meaningful goal that “potentiality” is pursued, no mention of justification of what “good” actually entails. In fact, it is left open to the extent such that emotional desires or feelings of entitlements can be defended vigorously enough to be taken seriously. “Good” and “bad” are assumed as if a priori considerations were thorough enough. If we are to take “dignity” as a means of justification, a significantly more vigorous defense than what is currently proffered is desperately necessary. As it stands, hinging rights in dignity is decisively weak.
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