|
|
|
|
|
|
The Gaza Crisis Explained: Part 2
By Luke Thomas
Jul 30, 2004
fter weeks of upheaval in the Gaza between young militants, what has happened?
Predictably, very little.
On July 27 Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia officially rescinded his resignation only 10 days after offering it. Qureia cited total frustration with his inability to control Palestinian security forces that culminated in a series of kidnappings and general lawlessness that erupted in Gaza. Initially, Palestinian Authority President Yassir Arafat rejected Qureia’s resignation.
In a public display of unity, however, Qureia and Yassir Arafat made an appearance together to demonstrate that their tumultuous past was behind them. According to Islamonline.net, “Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmad [Qureia] retracted his resignation on Tuesday, July 27, after President [Yassir] Arafat gave him security powers, easing a damaging leadership crisis.”
Here are the alleged compromises and concessions that were made that allowed for reconciliation:
- Arafat agreed to allow the Palestinian Attorney General to pursue corruption investigations to foster “rule of law.”
- Initial reformations of consolidating the security services from approximately a dozen down to three will remain intact.
- PM Qureia was given control over one of the three security services, namely, the Palestinian Police. The new three branches are police, intelligence, and general security.
- Overall jurisdiction of the security services was not moved and is still under control of the National Security Council (NSC). Yassir Arafat heads the NSC.
- Qureia and Arafat agreed to adhere to “Basic Law” or the Palestinian constitution. The Basic Law mandates that internal security be under the Interior Minister who answers to the Prime Minister. It is not clear how this is to be the upheld if the Prime Minister has limited control of the services.
- While no firm decisions were made, a cabinet reshuffle was discussed.What does all this mean?
|
Clearly, it indicates Arafat is again not making any serious attempts at peace. While handing some power over to Qureia is a welcome change, it is not clear that he will receive full control even over that one branch. Moreover, Arafat’s move is a drop in the bucket: shifting the forces is mandated by the Palestinian constitution. Worse, even if Qureia has control over the police, ultimate control is still under the NSC, which is still Arafat’s prefecture.
On a certain (albeit minimal) level, Arafat’s resistance is understandable. Israel expects PA security forces to not only establish order within portions of the occupied territories (mostly against extremist militants), but also to protect Israeli forces. The PA has been constantly pressured to work directly to limit the danger faced by Israeli forces in the occupied territories. Even if Israel were right to expect this, such a request amounts to little more than wishful thinking. It is outlandishly unreasonable for an occupied and ineffectual security forces to not only protect its citizens, but that of the occupying military. Compound that notion with the unending history of poor cooperation between the two groups and unbridled hatred that has developed in the last four years of the intifadah and suddenly some of Arafat’s feet-dragging becomes understandable.
But Arafat has built a career by hedging himself against Israel. In his view, the key to his success and his ability to garner so much popular support has been through his refusal to budge an inch over negotiations with “the enemy.” Unlike other Arab leaders such as Egypt’s assassinated President Anwar Sadat, Arafat is not viewed as a leader who “caved” to the Israelis. He is one who hopes to be viewed as a steadfast and perennial Palestinian. Thus, rather than ever hoping to achieve a legacy for securing lasting peace, he would rather be viewed as the righteous nationalist, even if it is his national people who suffer in the process.
With Israel’s pullout of Gaza imminent, what is likely to happen?
A more accurate question is what could happen when Israel leaves Gaza. A best-case scenario would be one where both Israeli and Palestinian officials seek a peaceful outcome. Economically, Palestinian Authority economist Mohammed El-Samhouri is correct in suggesting that Gaza’s markets be made wide open. With access to the rest of the world, serious economic recovery that is sorely overdue could finally take place (there are also small, but clear security implications for peace if the economy in Gaza begins to recover). Second, “the plan has to be an integral part of a much wider vision for peace and reconciliation between Israel and Palestine.” In other words, “only a viable political process can restore stability and certainty, both of which are crucial for long-term private-sector-led investment and growth.”
To achieve that “viable political process”, Khalil Shikali, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, suggests immediate elections. Shikali argues that the security crises witnessed over the last two weeks is merely a foreshadowing of more violence to come. As Israel withdraws and creates a power vacuum, young militants will be further encouraged to seek power. A corrupt and ineffective PA will attempt to stop it, but with no real power to sway events in its favor. In the crossfire, both ordinary Israelis and Palestinians stand to suffer as the potential for full-fledged civil war breaks out.
Shikali believes that by holding elections soon, Islamists who feel neglected by the PA but supported by the people could introduce themselves into the government and thereby inject influence and their will for formation. Interestingly, Arafat would probably still be President, but with serious checks against his power. In this way, there would be a popular referendum that acknowledges the desires of ordinary citizens, a democratic inclusion of previously excluded parties, a peaceful stepping stone to Gaza’s future, and a check against the “old guard” of Palestinian politics (although without alienating them).
Admittedly, the idea of young Islamists holding office is disconcerting. But as Professor Noah Feldman has argued, this is a necessary step in the Arab world where secular nationalists are largely unpopular and virtually invincible mosques breed political action.
But what is the alternative? Consider these statistics collected by Shikali’s group: 87% of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank believe that corruption exists in the PA; two-thirds believe that public officials involved in, or accused of, corruption are “often not charged or brought to account”; 92% of Palestinians support internal and external calls for political reforms in the PA; 40% believe the PA is truly enacting reforms; 59% are concerned about possible Palestinian infighting after Israel’s withdrawal; 30% believe the PA has a high capacity to control internal matters after Israel leaves; and only 31% believe life in Gaza will return to order.
Relying on the PA and the promises of Yassir Arafat is not an option. Even with U.S. and Israeli boycotting, EU pressure and internal uprisings, the PA still seems unable or unwilling to achieve peaceful and democratic ends. One can only hope that democratic forces in Palestine prevail. The U.S. and international community should encourage these groups instead of idly waiting for a more adequate peace partner to materialize. Otherwise, the future for peace and stability are extremely bleak for both Israelis and Palestinians. |
|
 |
|
| | |
