n September 13th, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a comprehensive set of reforms intended to thwart future terrorist attacks in the country, ten days after Chechen terrorists killed over 300 people during a school siege in the North Ossetian city of Beslan. Interestingly, the reforms put forth by Mr. Putin focus mainly on changes in the country’s electoral system, rather than the beleaguered intelligence, law enforcement, and political issues at the root of the Chechen problem. As reported by the New York Times, Mr. Putin said he was instituting the reforms to create “a real dialogue and interaction between power and society in the fight against terror.” However, the power he refers to rests with himself and his party, United Russia, while society is left to suffer the consequences.
The chances for dialogue and negotiation are slim to none, if Mr. Putin’s record is any indication of how he will handle his latest attempt to consolidate power. In Vladimir Putin’s Russia, the siloviki, his small circle of advisers, many of whom are former KGB members, along with the United Russia party, seek to control all aspects of government, from the judiciary, to the legislature, to the media, and of course, within the Kremlin.
The three main reforms Mr. Putin proposed include: ending the “first past the post” system of elections in the lower house of parliament, the Duma, which provides candidates from minority and opposition parties with an opportunity to win seats and instead, instituting proportional representation; ending the direct election of regional governors, instead allowing the Kremlin nominate candidates who will be voted on by local parliaments; and giving the federal envoy in the North Caucusus more authority, along with a federal commission to coordinate military and economic activities in the region, CNN.com reported.
With Mr. Putin’s United Russia party and its allies controlling two-thirds of the Kremlin, it would follow that their candidates for regional office would be of a similar persuasion. Additionally, by instituting a proportional representation policy in the Duma, opposition parties are marginalized, and United Russia, along with the president, gains even more authority. The third proposal, a small step in the right direction, is not going to be effective unless the commission established works with moderate forces within the Chechen resistance, an unlikely event. The problems in the North Caucusus go beyond the political; the region is poverty-stricken and corruption is rampant, between rigged elections that produce politicians beholden to Moscow, and terrorists who kidnap citizens in order to demand ransom.
In an interview with MosNews.com, an independent news agency established by jailed oil tycoon and oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Vladimir Ryzhkov, a liberal member of the Duma said:
“this clearly has nothing to do with terrorism. In his address to the nation on 4 September the president himself assured us that all measures for combating terrorism would not run counter to the Constitution…we should reject such proposals forthwith by addressing the president with a polite letter, because the Duma Charter says that the State Duma cannot discuss drafts that violate the Constitution. If the Duma were honest with the people, that is what it should do.”
Mr. Ryzhkov’s statements are a breath of fresh air for those interested in real reform, however, he is the minority in the Duma, and will probably not be able to gather enough of a coalition to resist Mr. Putin and United Russia’s assault on the constitution.
Andrei A. Piontovsky of the Center for Strategic Studies, echoed Mr. Ryzkhov’s thoughts, and pointed out that Mr. Putin’s scheme would further alienate the North Caucusus, home to many of the terrorists. In an interview with the New York Times, Mr. Piontovsky said:
“It is not only stupid…it is very sensitive for the national republics like Tatarstan and those in the North Caucasus. It will be a humiliation to the people there."
As detailed by Brian Taylor writing for the Center of Strategic Studies, in his 2002 campaign autobiography First Person, Mr. Putin talked of aspirations to resolve the problems in the North Caucusus as a top priority, one he hoped would define his second term. If what Mr. Piontovsky described becomes a reality, Mr. Putin would fail miserably, and could leave the situation worse off than it was before his tenure.
According to Taylor, Mr. Putin’s first term ended with promises of a strong Russian state, and a willingness that, if re-elected, he would continue to build a strong Russia. Unfortunately, the Taylor surmises, the past actions and past promises that led to Mr. Putin’s re-election in 2004 and the current crises facing his country were an “illusion…the ability of the state to implement reliably and enforce its decisions has not appreciably increased.” Instead, Taylor argues, the Kremlin has been strengthened, while local governments, moderate leaders, and Russia as a whole, have weakened.
The current electoral reforms propose to implement exactly the system Mr. Putin desires: a strong Kremlin with control over the state and local levels of government, with special authority in the tumultuous North Caucusus. With such a tight grip on all levels of government, several media outlets, and the Kremlin at his fingertips to violate the Constitution when he deems it necessary, Vladimir Putin is insulating himself against criticism and acting more like an authoritarian ruler than president of an emerging democracy. Rather than work on real problems facing his country, such as terrorism and poverty, he uses tragedies such as Beslan to augment his own political power, while citizens pay the price.
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